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The principle of identity as originally formulated by Aristotle states
that everything exists in its own way, which is its identity. However, if we
take the word “existence” to mean precisely the way by which anything
exists, which is its ultimate, concrete “being,” then we have that anything
must be the same as (the way of) its being, hence that anything must
be identical to itself. Meaning, say, a falsehood must be identical to itself:
although we may render such an identity meaningless by taking falsehoods
as nonexistent, we still cannot say “there is no falsehood” without making
all that is false be rather true – if what is false is to be false, then falsehoods
must be something. But what is the necessary identity between a falsehood
and itself? What means the statement “a falsehood must be precisely that
falsehood”? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can
be taken as meaning:
1. Something false.
2. The falsity of something.
If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something
becomes the same as its own falsity, so:
1. If we take that falsehood as a being – hence both what is false and
its falsity as having that same being – then being false is just a being,
so everything is false, by which either there is no truth or truths are
the same as falsehoods.
2. If we take that falsehood as a nonbeing – hence both what is false
and its falsity as having that same nonbeing – then being false is just
a nonbeing, so nothing is false, by which either there is no falsehood
or falsehoods are the same as truths.
To escape such unsolvable contradictions, we must rather choose the
meaning according to which a falsehood is the falsity of something, despite
being that something as false. Which combines the two previous options
in a third one, by identifying what is false and its own falsity to each other
as respectively a nonbeing and a being:
1. If what is false were different from its own falsity, then it would
be possibly true – or possibly false – rather than actually false – or
impossibly true.
2. If what is false were a being, then it would be a true being, rather
than a false one.
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3. If the falsity of something were nothing, then that something would
be true rather than false.
Thus, the being of a falsehood is the falsity of something, by which
alone it is the nothingness of that something rather than absolute nothing-
ness – which is the falsity of nothing. A falsehood is a being that, as any
other being, must itself be true since, if it were false, then it would be the
circumstance of whatever is false being true rather than false: the falsity of
something must be true as the circumstance of that something being false
to be false as whatever that circumstance falsifies – it is itself a truth by
being a true falsehood, or it is no longer the falsity of something. Hence,
the only way for us to maintain the principle of identity regarding false-
hoods – without running into unsolvable contradictions – is by taking any
falsehood as meaning its own truth – the true falsity of something – so self-
identity regards only truths – of either true falsehoods or simple truths –
to become “every truth must be identical to itself.” However, being faithful
to the original meaning of such an identity, which is that anything exists in
its own way, we must rather say that “every truth must be true,” since the
proper way of a truth to exist – by which alone it is identical to itself – is
to be true.
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